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Introduction 
Enterprise policy constitutes policies aimed at both start-ups (entrepreneurship policies) 
and existing firms classified as small and medium-sized enterprises (SME policies), 
with µvirtually all organs of government [having] programs which qualify as either EP 
or SMEP¶ (Lundström et al., 2014: 946). Governments intervene in a range of ways, 
acting as µ«D UHJXODWRU LQFHQWLYLVHU DQG IDFLOLWDWRU RU DV D VXSSOLHU¶ as well as a 
supporter of other, non-governmental forms of influence and support (Bennett, 2014: 
25). Such interventions have existed for a long time, in the UK at least since the 1930s, 
gaining significance in political discourse since the 1970s with expenditure rising to 
£8bn per year (Greene et al., 2007; Hughes, 2008; Richard, 2008). We therefore argue 
that it is important to examine SME policies and the characterisation of the category 
µ60(¶LQSROLWLFDOGLVFRXUVH 
Despite significant efforts and expenditure, UK SME policies have often failed to 
achieve the aims of policymakers (Bridge, 2010) and persistent doubts surround their 
necessity and cost effectiveness (Curran, 2000). Evaluations of SME policies have 
proven challenging (Curran, 2000; Storey, 2005) and have produced mixed results, with 
government-sponsored evaluations tending to be more positive than independent, 
academic evaluations (Bridge, 2010; Huggins, 1997). Critical considerations of specific 
policies have identified problems with displacement and deadweight effects (Curran and 
Storey, 2002; Nightingale and Coad, 2016; Wren, 1996) as well as a lack of 
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understanding of the challenges identified (Nightingale and Coad, 2016). Researchers 
have also questioned whether policies are sufficiently coordinated (Huggins and 
Williams, 2009; Turok, 1997), whether available research evidence is being overlooked 
in forming policy (Arshed et al., 2014; Curran and Storey, 2002) and whether 
government ministers and policymakers have sufficient expertise to intervene in timely 
and relevant ways (Bennett 2008). Reflecting on these criticisms, Blackburn and 
Schaper (2012) present three persistent challenges to the development of SME policy: a 
lack of progress due to poor learning from previous experience; poor use of the 
evidence base or rigorous evaluation; and poor collaboration and information sharing 
between relevant parties. 
In this article, we analyse UK political manifestoes from 1964-2015 to examine the 
development of SME policy in political discourse. We do this by analysing how the 
broadly-GHILQHG FDWHJRU\ RI µ60(¶ KDV EHHQ FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ SROLWLFLDQV LQ party 
manifestoes and assess these characterisations in relation to the empirical evidence base. 
We highlight three consistent themes in UK political manifestoes during the past 50 
years where SMEs have been characterised as having the potential for growth, 
struggling to access finance and being over-burdened by regulation. We argue that 
homogenising the broad range of businesses represented by the SME category and 
characterising them in these terms misrepresents them, undermining policies developed 
in relation to this mischaracterisation. We begin the article by briefly tracing the 
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category of SME and why it is important to understand how this category has come to 
be characterised. 
Categorising SMEs 
To effectively deliver policy, the European Commission has, since 2005, defined SMEs 
for itself and its member states (including the UK) as enterprises that µemploy fewer 
than 250 persons; and have either an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million or 
an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million¶ European Commission, 
2015: 10). In the UK, where statistics tend to reflect the employment definition (fewer 
than 250 employees), SMEs have come to represent 99.9% of private businesses (BIS, 
2016). This includes a diverse range of firms in terms of size, age, industry and locality 
(Cosh and Hughes, 1996; Huggins et al, 2015) and less tangible dimensions such as the 
ILUP¶V UHODWLRQVKLSV ZLWK WKH ODERXU PDUNHW PDQDJHPHQW VW\OH RU DYDLODEOH QHWZRUNV
(Gilman and Edwards, 2007; Wapshott and Mallett, 2015). While it lacks specificity, the 
SME category is a way of grouping together firms that, until the 1960s, had been 
relatively ignored in UK politics (Beesley and Wilson, 1981). An important 
development in addressing this omission was the formation of the Bolton Committee.  
The Bolton Committee was appointed in 1969 by the Labour government to assess the 
role of small firms in the UK economy and make recommendations on improving 
government policy. The Committee adopted the definition of less than 200 employees 
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from its terms of reference for manufacturing firms and µD VHULHV RI PRUH RU OHVV
DUELWUDU\GHILQLWLRQVLQWHUPVRIZKDWHYHUPHDVXUHVDSSHDUDSSURSULDWHIRURWKHUWUDGHV¶ 
due to a lack of comprehensive records (Bolton, 1971: 2). The categorisation of 
businesses that was reinforced by these definitions has proven influential, with the 
&RPPLWWHH¶VILQGLQJVDQGUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRUPLQJµWKHEHGURFNRIYLUWXDOO\DOO[SME] 
UHVHDUFKDQDO\VLVDQGSROLF\PDNLQJ¶&XUUDn and Stanworth, 1982: 3; see also HL Deb 
12 February 2003; Kirby, 2004). While SME has become the dominant term, it is often 
used in UK policymaking interchangeably ZLWK µVPDOO EXVLQHVV¶ (NAO, 2006), 
reflecting the %ROWRQ &RPPLWWHH¶V DLPV DV GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJ WKHVH EXVLQHVVHV from large 
firms. 
However, the report was a reflection rather than a cause of the growing political 
prominence of SMEs that accompanied the retreat of Keynsianism (Nightingale and 
Coad, 2016) and did not fix a definitive way of categorising SMEs in UK politics. 
µSME¶ is a flexible category that is invariably functional, albeit the general trend has 
been towards greater simplification, often losing Bolton¶s attention to sector (Ward and 
Rhodes, 2014). The specific definition adopted depends on the formulation of particular 
policies, usually in practical terms of employee numbers or financial turnover (e.g. HL 
Deb 12 February 2003). Further, the definitions for qualifying criteria can be subject to 
change, for example in the expansion of Small Firm Employment Subsidy (from a 50 
employee limit to 200) or the extension of exemptions from Value-Added Taxation and 
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statutory audit requirements (in terms of turnover). These changes in the SME definition 
illustrate how it can function as a statistical convenience, representing for example the 
H[WHQWRI D VFKHPH¶V IXQGLQJ UDWKHU WKDQ WKH IRFXVHG WDUJHWLQJRI DGLVFUHWH JURXSRI
businesses.  
Given the heterogeneity and significant changes within the population of businesses 
categorised as SMEs (Cosh and Hughes, 1996, 1998; Hughes, 2008), it is perhaps 
surprising that this category should be used as a focus for policy. Nonetheless, the SME 
category is frequently deployed in political discourse and in policymaking in terms of 
its rationale, forms of intervention and qualifying criteria. The area of SME policy that 
has emerged in relation to this categorisation of a loosely gathered collection of 
businesses has been developed in terms of how they have been characterised and it is 
this characterisation in UK political discourse and its implications for policymaking that 
forms our analytical focus. 
Characterising SMEs 
The purpose of the Bolton Committee and part of its subsequent influence was in 
making sense of the economic role of SMEs and developing policy recommendations 
aimed at them (Fuller, 2003). Committee Chair John BROWRQDUJXHGWKDWSUHYLRXVO\µthe 
formulation of industrial policy has inevitably proceeded without adequate knowledge 
of smDOO ILUPV¶ (Bolton, 1971: xv). The Committee argued that what gives unity and 
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meaning to the category of the small firm is that they have relatively little market share, 
personalised management and that they tend to lack formal management structures and 
unions. Subsequent debates around how to characterise SMEs and the challenges they 
IDFHUHIOHFWWKHZD\VLQZKLFKSROLWLFDODFWRUVµcompose stories that describe harms and 
difficulties, attribute them to actions of other individuals or organizations, and thereby 
claim the right to invoke government power to stop the harm¶6WRQH7he 
characterisation of SMEs, in terms of their distinguishing features and the challenges 
they are perceived to face, represents a framing of the problem that is taken up by 
politicians and policymakers with SRZHUIXO LPSOLFDWLRQVIRU WKHµRYHUWXUHSURFHVVDQG
RXWFRPH¶RISROLF\PDNLQJ:HLVV; see also Rochefort and Cobb, 1993). 
As we will discuss, this category and its characterisation has been taken up, developed, 
revised and renewed by politicians as well as by other political actors. It guides 
policymaking in terms of identifying how to provide support for these businesses or 
remove barriers they are perceived to face. The Bolton Report continued to be an 
important reference point for government reports and white papers (e.g. Burdens on 
Business, DTI, 1985) but the characterisation of SMEs, as with other areas of 
policymaking, is malleable (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993) and has shifted with different 
political contexts, economic challenges and the development of new insights (Weiss, 
1989). It is the changing characterisation of SMEs that we seek to analyse in this article 
to gain insights into the underlying assumptions that underpin SME policies. 
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Specifically, we analyse political manifestoes to explore how SMEs have been 
characterised in UK political discourse during the period 1964-2015. If a political 
manifesto sets out what its authors see as problems and potential policy solutions, once 
elected on the basis of this manifesto the incoming government is establishing a 
platform for action. The characterisations of the SME category create the impression of 
common concerns and challenges, a problem definition that governments then seek to 
address (Weiss, 1989). Our analysis highlights three significant ways that SMEs are 
characterised relating to their having the potential for growth, struggling to access 
funding and being over-burdened by regulation, each of which act as causal stories, 
creating particular roles for government intervention (Stone, 1989). We draw on the 
empirical evidence base to challenge these portrayals and argue that, if the businesses 
homogenised under categories such as SME are significantly mischaracterised then 
SME policy will continue to be ineffective. 
Methodology: Analysing UK Political Debate on SMEs 
Political manifestoes 
To explore the characterisation of SMEs in UK political discourse, we analyse General 
Election manifestoes from the period 1964-2015. The inclusion and treatment of topics 
such as SMEs in political texts are important influences on how they are framed and 
understood more widely (Atkinson, 2015; Finlayson, 2007). General Election 
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manifestoes represent a significant series of comparable political texts over time and are 
therefore an important source of understanding how SMEs are characterised (Beesley 
and Wilson, 1981; Beresford, 2015). 
Manifestoes µ«FRQVLVW RI VWDWHPHQWV FRQQRWLQJ LQWHQWLRQV HPSKDVHV SURPLVHV
pledges, policies or goals to be activated should that party achieve office¶ (Bara, 2005: 
585). As such, these official statements produced by political parties establish a platform 
for action if elected and a record against which parties and party leaders can be held to 
account (Laver and Garry, 2000). Moreover, evidence suggests that elected parties 
generally follow-through on manifesto pledges, especially in Britain¶s political 
institutional structure (Bara, 2005; Royed, 1996). The issues featured by manifestoes 
and the positions taken on those issues are therefore important. 
Our period of analysis incorporates each General Election from 1964 to 2015, following 
Beesley and Wilson (1981), who demonstrate how SME research and policymaking in 
the UK intensified from the mid-1960s (also see Bennett, 2014; Dannreuther and 
Perren, 2013; Kirby, 2004). This is not to suggest that SME policy did not exist before 
this period, see for example discussions in the Macmillan Committee (1931) and the 
Radcliffe Committee (1959), but rather that it became more prominent after the 1960s. 
The period 1964-2015 features political parties of different ideologies operating across a 
wide range of social and economic contexts addressing SMEs in their manifestoes in 
increasing detail, something we explore in the findings below.  
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We focus on the three µmainstream¶ parties of the period, referred to here as 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal (the latter encompassing: SDP-Liberal Alliance, 
1981, Social & Liberal Democrats, 1988, and Liberal Democrats, 1989), providing an 
opportunity to observe areas of consensus, difference and development in how SMEs 
were characterised over time (Laver and Garry, 2000). Our period of analysis covers 14 
General Elections and includes a total of 42 manifestoes. The year of each election is 
listed in Table 1 together with the title of each manifesto and subheadings relating to 
sections engaged with SME policy. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Analysing political manifestoes 
Thematic coding was used to analyse each manifesto in terms of SMEs and SME policy. 
Given the breadth of the category SME and the potential ways in which its use may 
have changed during the period of analysis we analysed the manifestoes in terms of a 
range of potential synonyms. In the first instance, each manifesto was searched 
electronically for the following principal terms (and variants): business; enterprise; 
entrepreneur; independent trader; new business; own account; self-employed; 
shopkeeper; small firm; sole trader; and SME. We are not suggesting that these terms 
are each equivalent to SME but, instead, that these terms relate to potential areas of 
what we are referring to as SME policy (following Lundström et al., 2014, and others) 
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and therefore to the characterisation of the SME category. Sections of text containing 
one or more of the search terms were analytically coded before each manifesto was re-
read in full to check the rigour of the initial analysis and to establish a clearer sense of 
the context surrounding the mention of SMEs (and related terms) as well as to ensure a 
broader understanding of the parties¶ positioning for each General Election. 
The inductive analysis identified characterisations of SMEs as having the potential for 
growth, struggling to access funding and being over-burdened by regulation. In our 
Findings we discuss the emergence and development of these characterisations. We set 
aside the additional issue of taxation, specifically its burdensome nature on SMEs 
because, in this context, it overlaps into the personal finances of the business-owners 
rather than being concerned with the enterprises per se and we are focused on the 
characterisation of SMEs. Having identified the key themes we grounded our analysis 
through the identification of relevant government policy interventions, to address 
concerns that manifestoes contain simply empty talk or rhetoric (Laver and Garry, 
2000). We then explored evidence from a range of sources, principally academic 
literature (including key research projects such as Storey, 1994, the Small Business 
Research Trust, SBRT no date, and the Centre for Business Research, CBR, e.g. Cosh 
and Hughes, 1996, 1998, 2000, and Cosh et al 2009b) to understand whether these 
characterisations of SMEs are supported empirically. The following section presents the 
results of our analysis. 
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Findings 
Our focus on the characterisation of SMEs in political manifestoes inevitably 
foregrounds SMEs over other aspects of contemporary political debate. In the next 
section we therefore offer a broad overview of how SMEs have been characterised in 
General Election manifestoes in relation to political debates and the wider context. In 
the subsequent three sections, we then discuss in greater detail the core characterisations 
of SMEs as having the potential for growth, struggling to access finance and being over-
burdened by regulation. 
SMEs in UK political manifestoes 
The approach to industrial strategy in the 1960s continued earlier policies to target full 
employment by focusing on specific industries and large businesses and, for Labour 
especially, this meant mergers and acquisitions to develop economies of scale and 
exploit new technology (Tomlinson, 1994). However, SMEs were appearing on the 
political agenda in relation to particular sectors, early manifesto mentions including, for 
example, the 1964 Liberal pledge to protect shopkeepers from discrimination from 
suppliers.  
With the economic challenges of the late 1960s and the beginnings of a significant 
move away from Keynsianism, SME policy became more prominent following 
interventions such as, in 1969, the Conservative Political Centre SDPSKOHW µFrom 
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Acorns to Oaks¶Weatherill and Cope, 1969) and /DERXU¶V appointment of the Bolton 
Committee. The subsequent Conservative government had established in its 1970 
PDQLIHVWRWKDWLWZRXOGµGHFLGHWKHEHVWPHWKRGof providing advice and encouragement 
IRUVPDOOEXVLQHVVHV LQ WKH OLJKWRI WKH%ROWRQ5HSRUW¶DUJXLQJ WKDW µ6PDOOEXVLQHVVHV
KDYHKDGD UDZGHDO IURP/DERXU¶, criticisms echoed by the Liberals. From this point 
onwards, SMEs are principally characterised in the manifestoes as small, often referred 
WRDVµVPDOOEXVLQHVVHV¶that is, in contrast with larger organisations. This contrast, and 
the emphasis that SMEs are a distinct grouping, underpins a belief that they have 
particular needs that politicians can help to address (May and McHugh, 2002; Stone, 
1989). This can be seen in the manifestoes where SMEs are addressed by specific 
policies as well as receiving proposed exemptions, for example from workforce training 
initiatives (Liberal, 1997). 
The importance of SMEs to the UK economy, and especially the growth of these firms 
providing a source of employment (see the next section), came to form a common 
theme in the political manifestoes. The Conservative October 1974 manifesto featured a 
dedicated section on Small Businesses LQZKLFKWKLVµEDFNERQHRI%ULWLVKHQWHUSULVH¶LV
GHVFULEHG DV µLPPHQVHO\ LPSRUWDQW WR WKH HFRQRPLF OLIH RI %ULWDLQ and to future 
industrial growth¶. From the mid-1970s, the language of the manifestoes repeatedly 
associates SMEs with economic growth, whether through references to them DV µWKH
VHHGFRUQ RI WKH HFRQRP\¶ DQG µthe seedcorn of Britain's prosperity¶ &RQVHUYDWLYH
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1992, 1997) or forming part of plans for industrial renewal (e.g. Liberal, 1979; Labour 
1992). Irrespective of political and economic context, this characterisation of SMEs as 
central to the economy and to economic growth has become common across all three 
political parties HJ UHPDLQLQJ µWKH EDFNERQH RI RXU HFRQRP\¶ /DERXU , for 
some commentators reflecting WKHDSSURSULDWLRQRI60(VE\µWKHSROLWLFVRIHFRQomic 
JURZWK¶)XOOHU 2).  
By the time of the 1979 General Election, policy proposals were beginning to engage 
with the potential for SMEs in tackling problems of high inflation and unemployment 
owing to their lack of concentrated market power and typically high labour-intensity 
(Bannock, 1981). The Conservative government elected in 1979 oversaw a credit-
inspired boom that saw the stock of SMEs expand significantly throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s (Hughes, 2008) and the development of high profile initiatives such as 
the Training and Enterprise Councils (Huggins, 1997). This period is often discussed in 
terms of neoliberalism and the manifestoes tied SMEs to key areas of neoliberal 
policymaking, including financialisation (SMEs characterised as struggling to access 
finance, see below), deregulation and market liberalisation (SMEs characterised as over-
burdened by regulation, see below) but also individual freedoms and the retreat of the 
state in terms of an enterprise culture and self-employment (though this was more 
clearly related to entrepreneurship and business start-up than SME policies). While 
ideological differences between the mainstream parties appeared stark, especially in 
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terms of state intervention, contemporary commentators noted that µSupport for small 
firms is that rara avis of industrial policy ± something which commands support across 
all the major parties¶ (Watkins et al., 1982: 1).  
By 1997, the traditional Conservative reputation for economic competence was 
tarnished by the failed Poll Tax and a troubled economy, experienced especially harshly 
among SMEs (Bank of England, 1992) and with a substantial decline in SMEs numbers 
(Hughes, 2008). Labour, having implemented significant changes under Tony Blair, 
claimed that µSupport for small businesses will have a major role in our plans for 
economic growth¶ (Labour, 1997). Forming their first government in 18 years, Labour 
developed an increasing interest in self-employment and SMEs shaped by their focus on 
regional development, including help for disadvantaged groups and communities 
(Beresford, 2015; Huggins and Williams, 2009; Huggins et al., 2014). In this way, new 
policy areas were brought within the scope of SME policy with these businesses, and 
entrepreneurship more generally, seen as a potential solution to a range of economic and 
societal challenges. The Conservatives tied their SME proposals to promoting the µright 
values¶, while the Liberals continued to develop SME policies in a range of specific 
areas and industries including supporting fisheries and local economies. While this 
broader sense of the implications of SME policy became commonplace, the 2010 and 
2015 General Elections were dominated by the 2008 economic crash and a lack of 
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confidence in the financial sector. In the manifestoes, access to finance by SMEs gained 
renewed attention, linked to prominent concerns with improving the banking sector.  
Across these periods of significant economic, social and political change, ideological 
shifts and differences between the main political parties, our analysis identifies an 
increasing amount of attention paid to SMEs in political manifestoes, as demonstrated 
in Table 2. Three significant characterisations of SMEs emerge from our analysis: 
having the potential for growth, struggling to access finance and being over-burdened 
by regulation. It is these characterisations and how they developed over time that we 
now discuss, taking each theme in turn. 
[Table 2 about here] 
SMEs have the potential to grow 
Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, SMEs have been associated with the potential to 
grow and thereby provide economic growth and renewal. Irrespective of 60(RZQHUV¶
desire to µconform to the idea of growth ± almost as a moral imperative¶ (Golby and 
Johns, 1971: 5), politicians began to emphasise their potential impact on reducing 
unemployment (e.g. HC Deb 24 Feb 1978). Within a general association of SMEs and 
growth, of interest to politicians has therefore been the potential for SME growth to 
contribute to job creation (Atkinson and Storey, 1994; Nightingale and Coad, 2013). 
Much of the increase in government intervention post-Bolton can be associated with 
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efforts to help SMEs grow (Beesley and Wilson, 1981), a level of initiatives that 
touched 3000 by 2006/7 (Public Accounts Committee, 2007). 
In the economic crises that set the scene for the 1979 General Election, with the country 
facing increasing unemployment DQG µHFRQRPLF GHFD\¶ /LEHUDO , the link 
between SME growth and job creation became increasingly important. The incumbent 
Labour Government promised the continuation of the small firms employment subsidy 
(paying small manufacturing firms for jobs created) and proposed returning jobs to the 
inner-cities by stimulating the development of SMEs. The soon-to-be-elected 
Conservatives asserted explicitly that µThe creation of new jobs depends to a great 
extent on the success of smaller businesses¶. For the Liberals, the link was more implicit 
but SMEs, and positive discrimination in their favour, was still associated with job 
creation.  
The idea that SMEs were responsible for a disproportionately high number of jobs had 
gained increased attention with the 1979 publication of %LUFK¶Vinfluential study. Birch 
reported that two-thirds of net new jobs created, in a sample of 5.6 million US 
businesses (1969-1976), were in firms employing twenty or fewer people (Birch, 1981). 
In 1984 Birch was invited to a job generation conference sponsored by the Department 
of Trade and Industry. The conference reflected the contrary evidence that had begun to 
emerge around the role of SMEs in creating new jobs and an increasing questioning of 
%LUFK¶VILQGLQJV (Ganguly, 1985; Hirschberg, 1999). Exploring the impact of SMEs as 
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MREFUHDWRUVLQWKH8.6WRUH\DQG-RKQVRQFRQFOXGHWKDWµ«RYHUDGHFDGH
half the jobs created in every 100 small firms occur in the four firms which grow 
IDVWHVW¶Similar findings have been reported from the CBR studies, for example in Cosh 
and Hughes (1996) and Bullock et al. (2000). More recently, Anyadike-Danes et al. 
(2015) highlight the importance of a very small number of µH[WUDRUGLQDU\ SUROLILF MRE
FUHDWRUV¶: 22). Research has therefore emphasised the role played not by the broad 
category of SMEs but by a minority of firms driving a disproportionate amount of job 
creation (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010).  
The problematic nature of claims that SMEs, rather than a minority of firms, are 
responsible for a disproportionate amount of net job creation has been widely discussed. 
However, in the manifestoes, characterising SMEs in these terms has persisted and SME 
policies have often followed this characterisation, not only in terms of the rationales 
presented but the details of the policies themselves. While a few policies targeted key 
sectors such as manufacturing, tKHIRFXVRQµ0RUH6PDOO)LUPV¶&RQVHUYDWLYH, 1983) or 
µ%DFNLQJ 6PDOO %XVLQHVV¶ Liberal, 1987) continued to propose measures relating to 
removing general obstacles affecting all SMEs rather than attempts to target the small 
proportion of firms responsible for a disproportionate amount of net job creation. For 
example, while Labour have generally had less to propose in this area, both 
Conservatives and Liberals have frequently suggested SME job creation could be 
supported through reductions in taxation, access to public procurement and the areas of 
 18 
access to finance and burdens of regulation discussed below. These types of proposal 
tend not discriminate amongst SMEs nor address how to support the limited number of 
potentially high growth firms.  
Where SME policy in the 1980s was focused largely on creating more SMEs, the 1988 
DTI white paper The Department for Enterprise marked a move towards improving the 
quality of SMEs. In setting out an (QWHUSULVH ,QLWLDWLYH WKLVSDSHUVKLIWHGDWWHQWLRQ µWR
concentrate resources on improving the competitiveness of small and medium-sized 
ILUPV¶:UHQ: 185; see also Greene et al., 2007; North et al., 1997). By the 1992 
General Election, all three parties were making manifesto commitments concerning 
advisory and support services, building on earlier schemes such as the Small Firms 
Service and Business Development Service and leading to the expansion of more 
intensive support through government grants for accessing external consultancy 
(Bennett, 2012). Business Growth Training, for example, WDUJHWHGVXSSRUWIRUµVPDOOHU¶
firms (defined as fewer than 500 employees), providing financial support to access 
training and improve performance.  
Government white papers included proposals to target high growth firms (e.g. DTI, 
1994, 1995; see Smallbone, 1997) on the basis that µ6PDOOILUPV>«@DUHDPDMRUVRXUFH
RI MRE FUHDWLRQ¶ DTI, 1994: 12). Business Link (a state-funded µRQH VWRS VKRS¶ IRU
business support, proposed and developed in the manifestoes of all three parties) 
therefore aimed to help more small firms to grow into medium and large businesses, 
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representing a shift from focusing primarily on start-ups to existing businesses (Priest, 
1999). Business Link¶V Personal Business Advisors were instructed to target growth-
oriented firms (Smallbone, 1997), in addition to Business Link¶V PRUH JHQHUDO 60(
focus (defined by employment numbers). However, Forte (2011) recounts his personal 
experience that there was a lack of clarity on how to define or identify these businesses 
and this contributed to a more general variability of provision (Bennett and Robson, 
2004).  
Having the potential to grow is an important characterisation of SMEs throughout the 
manifestoes but, as Kiviluoto (2013) argues, business growth is not part of the everyday 
realities of running an SME for many owner-managers. The majority of firms do not 
grow in size but are, for roughly half of all new businesses, likely to fail within the first 
four years (Storey, 2011; see also Coad et al., 2013). The characterisation, apparent in 
the manifestoes, of SMEs as having growth potential is therefore wide of the mark, 
contraction or exit appears to be the most likely outcome over the longer-term 
(Anyadike-Danes et al., 2015). Further, as Shane (2009: 142) argues, most business 
founders are not establishing their business in order to grow them and create jobs but, 
UDWKHUDV µZDJH-VXEVWLWXWLRQEXVLQHVVHV¶ VHHDOVR6FDVHDQG*RIIHH6ORDQDQG
Chittenden, 2006). Even during the 1980s, the µage of the small business owner¶ (Scase 
and Goffee, 1987: 17), attitudes towards business growth remained mixed (Hakim, 
1989; Scase and Goffee, 1987; Storey, 1989) and varied by firms¶ size (Cosh and 
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Hughes, 1994). Perhaps most disappointingly for the politicians who pin their hopes for 
job generation on SMEs, responses to the Small Business Research Trust survey across 
the 1990s and early 2000s indicate that SME owners did not view business growth in 
terms of providing employment, preferring to grow turnover and profits rather than 
headcounts (SBRT, no date; also see Gibb, 2000; Greene et al., 2004) 
Characterising SMEs, generally, as having the potential to grow and create jobs may 
prove popular in manifestoes but seems to bear only limited resemblance to the 
portrayal of SMEs in the research literature. It is apparent that some SMEs have the 
potential to grow and a handful prove extremely successful at creating new jobs. It 
cannot be said, however, that the performance of these few firms provides a helpful 
model on which to base a wider characterisation of SMEs or their potential role in the 
economy. A more accurate characterisation for a majority of SMEs would reflect an 
ambivalent attitude towards growth, especially in respect of jobs, from owner-managers 
for whom business contraction or exit appear to be the most likely outcome over the 
long-term.  
SMEs struggle to access finance  
There have been long-standing and persistent concerns raised in relation to the 
availability of finance for SMEs since at least 1931 when the Macmillan Committee 
reported difficulties for small firms obtaining long-term capital (Macmillan, 1931). The 
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so-called Macmillan gap (Frost, 1954), implying a market failure in terms of provision, 
is perceived as harming not only the daily operation of SMEs but to act as a brake on 
business growth: firms are not able to invest and thereby expand. These concerns are 
reflected in UK political manifestoes where SMEs are characterised as facing problems 
in accessing external finance. While the Liberals in 1970 highlighted the µcredit 
squeeze¶ among µvery heavy burdens¶ on SMEs, the Conservatives in October 1974 
argued that µSmall businesses often face the problem of long-term finance¶ and 
committed to setting up an enquiry to investigate. Labour, after winning this election, 
set up the Wilson Committee which published a 1979 report that identified some supply 
side problems in SME finance whilst acknowledging that many of the relative 
difficulties in accessing finance relate to the higher costs and risks of providing finance 
to these firms (Wilson, 1979). 
In the 1980s, finance was tied to the concerns with SME growth discussed above, with 
both the Conservative and Liberal parties promising to extend a Business Start-Up 
Scheme to boost the numbers and the growth of SMEs by providing tax relief for 
investors. By the 1992 General Election, all three main parties were promising policy 
extensions or innovations to boost SMEs¶ access to finance, with Conservatives and 
Labour offering special conditions for µinner-city areas¶ and µwomen and ethnic 
minority¶ businesses respectively. More recently, the characterisation of SMEs as credit-
constrained returned to prominence as part of political responses to the financial crisis 
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when the availability of bank lending and other forms of finance was reduced, 
particularly for firms with high demands or perceived as otherwise risky (Fraser et al., 
2013). In 2010, the Conservatives promised µmore diverse forms of affordable credit for 
small businesses [through] a national loan guarantee scheme¶ on the basis that µlack of 
access to credit remains a problem, especially for SMEs¶. The Labour Party promised to 
µcreate a new Small Business Credit Adjudicator with statutory powers ensuring that 
SMEs are not turned down unfairly when applying to banks for finance.¶ This continued 
into 2015 when, for example, Labour argued that the µ«ORQJ-standing problems of our 
banking system mean that too many small and medium-sized businesses cannot get the 
finance they need to invest and grow.¶ 
The manifestoes therefore tend to identify supply-side problems, an unwillingness on 
the part of financial institutions to provide finance to SMEs, and policies have followed. 
For example, in the mid-1970s the National Enterprise Board contained a remit for 
providing equity and loan capital to SMEs seeking funds at the lower end of the market 
(Lonsdale, 1997). As with schemes that would follow, such as the Business Expansion 
Scheme and various incarnations of loan guarantee schemes, the significance of positive 
impacts from such interventions has been called into question (Parker, 2002; Storey, 
1994). The Enterprise Finance Guarantee scheme, for example, established in 2009 to 
replace the Small Firms Loan Guarantee ZLWKD UDWLRQDOHµWDUJHWHGDWVPDOOEXVLQHVVHV
affected by lack of security that would otherwise not be able to access conventional 
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EDQNORDQV¶UHSUHVHQWHG up to just 2% of the term loan market for SMEs (Allinson et al., 
2013: v). 
Clearly, firms operate within a wider context that can influence business conditions 
(Curran, 1987). During times of recession, when available finance may be reduced 
JHQHUDOO\ µ«OHQGLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV DSSHDU WR XVH ILUP VL]H DV WKHLU SULPDU\ OHQGLQJ
criterion, with micro-business in particular being restULFWHG LQ LWV DFFHVV WR FDSLWDO¶ 
(Cowling et al., 2012: 794). However, examinations of the availability of bank credit 
during the 1980s (Cosh and Hughes, 1994; DTI, 1991) found that few difficulties were 
faced in obtaining necessary finance for investment. An analysis of manufacturing and 
business services firms, employing up to 500 people, in the mid- to late-1990s 
suggested WKDW µIHZ ILUPV IDFH D SUREOHP LQ REWDLQing all of their desired external 
FDSLWDO¶Cosh et al., 2009a: 1531). Based on data gathered in 2005, Freel et al. (2012) 
also report the vast majority of applicants for credit being approved. SMEs that are 
µKLJK-JURZWK¶ RU SXUVXLQJ LQQRYDWLYH OLQHV RI EXsiness, potentially heightening 
informational asymmetries (and, perhaps, the perception of risk), may be more likely to 
report significant finance problems (Ennew and Binks, 1996; Freel, 2007; BIS, 2012; 
Baldock, 2016). However, the accumulation of evidence throughout our period of 
analysis suggests that the supply-side problems repeated in the manifestoes concerning 
the broad SME category, and many of the finance-related policies that have followed 
them, is over-stated.  
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Provision of finance is also subject to demand and desire for external finance is not 
widespread among SME owners. Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Watson and Wilson, 2002) indicates that firms use internal funds before 
seeking external sources, meaning that not all firms will seek bank loans and very few 
will sacrifice a share of ownership for equity investment (Cosh et al., 2009a; Freel, 
2007; Parker, 2002; Wilson, 1979). During periods of heightened uncertainty demand is 
likely to decline further, although it is worth noting that this was a more significant 
issue in the recession following the financial crisis than, for example, the recession of 
1991 (Cosh et al., 2009b). BIS (2012) cites data for SMEs with turnover below £1m as 
being net depositors to the tune of £3.7bn at the end of 2007. A more accurate 
characterisation of SMEs, albeit still an over-generalisation, may therefore be a lack of 
desire for external finance, especially equity finance (accepting a role for 
discouragement, Fraser, 2014). Overlooking demand-side perspectives on accessing 
finance suggests a contributing factor for why supply-side-oriented policy measures 
based on a mischaracterisation of the SME category are likely to fail. 
SMEs are over-burdened by regulation 
Regulation has figured prominently in political discourse around SMEs. While initially 
focused on taxation and largely the preserve of the Conservatives in the 1970s and 
1980s, since the early 1990s all three mainstream parties have included proposals for 
reducing or reforming regulations, including to limit the impacts on SMEs. The 1979 
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Conservative manifesto provides a clear example of how this agenda developed to 
address perceived barriers, detailing the need to reduce taxation, form-filling and 
µamend laws such as the Employment Protection Act where they damage smaller 
businesses - and larger ones too - and actualO\SUHYHQWWKHFUHDWLRQRIMREV¶ 
This policy agenda developed as part of broader market liberalisation. It won influential 
support with the work of Djankov (e.g. Djankov et al., 2002, Djankov, 2009) which 
argued that the costs of regulation present a burden on entrepreneurs and that the 
creation of a low regulation economy, principally through deregulation, would therefore 
encourage business start-up and growth. However, Capelleras et al. (2008: 691) explain 
that those studies providing evidence for the Djankov view draw upon official data that 
exclude non-registered businesses. Such studies tend towards a macroeconomic focus 
and often draw inferences from data reflecting relatively large SMEs, overlooking the 
experiences of the more numerous very small firms within the SME category. These 
macroeconomic findings are not clearly reflected in the reported firm-level experiences 
of SMEs owners themselves. When asked about the main obstacles to the success of 
their businesses, owners express a range of views over time and reflecting other 
influences, but regulation tops the tables infrequently (see e.g. SBRT, no date).  
Nonetheless, the manifestoes and subsequent policies (and advisory bodies such as the 
Better Regulation Task Force) introduced the idea of µbetter¶ regulation alongside 
deregulation. After 18 years in government, the 1997 Conservative manifesto claimed 
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they had µDEROLVKHG RYHU D WKRXVDQG UHJXODWLRQV¶ &DPSDLJQLQJ IRU UH-election they 
explained that, if they were to be re-electedQHZUHJXODWLRQVZRXOGµonly be introduced 
if it is clear that their benefits exceed their costs and they do not place an undue burden 
RQ D VPDOO ILUP¶. However, the Conservatives were defeated by a rebranded Labour 
party that promised WR µFXWXQQHFHVVDU\ UHG WDSH¶ and, after four years in government, 
ODWHUSURSRVHG WKDW µ5HJXODWLRQVKRXOGEH LQWURGXFHGZKHUH LW LVQHFHVVDU\ LQD OLJKW-
touch way [they would also] examine opportunities to put time limits on regulations, 
deregulate by secondary legislation, and offer help to small ILUPV¶/DERXU 
Such talk has been a consistent feature of UK political manifestoes up to and including 
the General Election in 2015. The Conservative 2015 manifesto promised to µFXW D
further £10 billion of red tape over the next Parliament through our Red Tape Challenge 
and our One-In-Two-2XW UXOH¶. Regulation therefore continues to be presented as a 
quantitative problem: the more regulations cut, the easier growing a business becomes 
and this can be assessed through a cost-benefit analysis (BIS, 2015). However, 
regulations, and how they are interpreted, will affect businesses in different ways owing 
to differences in firm size, age and sector, competitive conditions, degrees of 
HQIRUFHPHQWDQGWKHUHVSRQVHVRIRWKHUVLQWKHILUP¶VH[WHUQDODQGLQternal environments 
(Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Kitching, 2006; Hart and Blackburn, 2005). Many regulations 
are also likely to not be relevant for particular SMEs. For example, an audit of 
government regulatory reform in the 2010-2015 Parliament found that 90% of the 
 27 
claimed cost reductions could be attributed to just ten regulatory decisions (NAO, 
2016). This may explain why studies have repeatedly shown that, while business-
owners complain about regulation in general, relatively few can provide specific 
instances of where their business has been affected by particular regulations (Edwards et 
al., 2004). Further, this approach fails to account adequately for those owner-managers 
who describe regulation as benefiting their business, not only in terms of creating a 
stable trading environment, establishing and protecting markets (DTI, 1985) but also by 
VXSSRUWLQJ D ILUP¶V GHYHORSPHQW RI PDQDJHPHQW FDSDELOLWLHV and formal processes 
(Kitching et al., 2015; Scott et al., 1989). 
The characterisation of SMEs as over-burdened by regulation remains influential. Yet, 
while bureaucracy is often a cost of doing business, research evidence raises questions 
whether it is one of the major challenges facing SMEs, sufficient to justify the attention 
it receives (Carter et al., 2009). Consequently, for SMEs the relevance and potential 
impact of deregulation and regulatory reform may be limited.  
Discussion 
The concerns with SMEs in the UK political manifestoes from 1964-2015 emerge from 
a relative absence prior to the 1970s to a focus on the quantity of businesses in the 
1980s, to quality in the 1990s and then to a more balanced approach, widening the 
policy focus to attend to social issues such as marginalised communities. These broad 
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trends are recognisable from the analysis of previous studies of SME policy such as 
Greene et al. (2007). Our analysis has sought to explore the underlying themes in 
political discourse throughout this period by analysing the key ways in which the 
category of SME has been characterised. These characterisations are important because 
they create the impression of common concerns and challenges within the SME 
category, a problem definition that governments then seek to address (Weiss, 1989). 
The three main UK political parties, despite their different ideological roots, have 
arrived at similar characterisations of SMEs during the period of analysis. SMEs have 
come to be characterised as having the potential for growth, struggling to access finance 
and being over-burdened by regulation. This has led to similar SME policy proposals in 
the manifestoes and a lack of rigorous debate in this area of policymaking. This is 
despite evidence that SME policies have often failed to achieve the aims of 
policymakers (Bridge, 2010), suffering displacement and deadweight effects (Curran 
and Storey, 2002; Nightingale and Coad, 2016; Wren, 1996), insufficient coordination 
(Huggins and Williams, 2009; Turok, 1997) and a tendency to overlook available 
research evidence (Arshed et al., 2014; Blackburn and Schaper, 2012; Curran and 
Storey, 2002).  
The creation of a distinct SME category has clear value for politicians and 
policymakers, simplifying complex heterogeneity (Curran and Blackburn, 2000; 
Leyshon, 1982; Massey, 2006) but also establishing a target for policy interventions by 
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creating a constituency to address and to fight for (Stone, 1989). However, this 
categorisation is problematic because it homogenises and obscures differences that may 
be important for understanding how firms operate, their different goals and the different 
challenges they encounter. This has been acknowledged periodically and some policies 
have targeted subsections of the SMEs category, although this has tended to be part of 
supporting particular sectors of the economy such as manufacturing. A recent, high 
profile report called for removing or revising the SME term and for a focus on high-
growth businesses (Coutu, 2014) and this appears to have been listened to in a 
subsequent green paper (HM Government, 2017). However, although the evidence 
supporting this move has been well-recognised for a long time (e.g. DTI, 1994, 1995) it 
has often not been reflected in policymaking and the jobs generated by those firms 
labelled as high growth or scale ups are frequently attributed to the much broader SME 
category throughout our period of analysis. This is then frequently used as a rationale 
for broader SME policymaking. 
We have demonstrated how the characterisation of the SME category in political 
discourse contradicts empirical evidence. Many of the firms grouped together by this 
statistical convenience have owners who are ambivalent about business growth, use 
internal funds before seeking external sources (and, when external, to prefer debt-
financing to equity financing) and are able to cope with regulation (with some studies 
suggesting the benefits of regulation, especially where they do pursue growth). If the 
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businesses homogenised under the SME category are significantly mischaracterised and 
the differences between them obscured, then policy in this area will continue to be 
ineffective. If seeking primarily to support job creators, addressing the concerns of the 
broad category of SMEs may itself be misguided given the disproportionate 
contribution of a handful of SMEs. 
The characterisation that has come to dominate discussion of the SME category in the 
manifestoes of the three main UK political parties is therefore a fundamental flaw in the 
development of SME policy. Failing to engage fully with empirical evidence has created 
a mischaracterisation that squeezes out the everyday experience in the majority of 
businesses. Policy developed to respond to the perceived challenges facing the firms in 
the SME category can only be developed effectively through a robust and rigorous 
understanding of these firms and their (variable) characteristics. A lack of rigorous, 
informed debate has contributed to failures to learn and develop in SME policymaking, 
resulting in a recycling of ineffective policies (Blackburn and Schaper, 2012; Bridge, 
2010; Greene et al., 2007; Huggins and Williams, 2009). Evidence-based debate is 
important in achieving useful categories of business and accurate characterisations from 
which policy can be rigorously developed; our analysis suggests this has not yet 
happened in SME policymaking.  
Conclusion 
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Analysis of political discourse in the UK in the form of General Election manifestoes 
from 1964-2015 suggests the existence of a broadly-defined SME category that has 
been mischaracterised as having the potential for growth, struggling to access finance 
and being over-burdened by regulation. While others have rightly identified the 
ineffective development, delivery and co-ordination of policy initiatives in this area, we 
have sought to contribute to this debate by arguing that the problematic nature of how 
SMEs are categorised and characterised creates a more fundamental problem. If the 
businesses homogenised under labels such as SME are significantly misrepresented and 
the differences between them are obscured, then it is not, for example, the coordination 
of policies that needs greatest attention but the assumptions underlying these policies. 
Importantly, these assumptions now appear shared across the mainstream political 
parties in the UK, lacking critical debate and new ideas. 
Our analysis has several limitations. Focus on SMEs within political manifestoes 
inevitably foregrounds these issues relative to wider considerations and risks placing too 
much emphasis on one area of policy. Further, while manifestoes are a valuable focus 
for analysis they are only a part of wider political debates. In choosing to cover a broad 
sweep of time we have prioritised breadth, trading-off depth as each aspect we have 
highlighted constitutes a field in itself. Nevertheless, the broader perspective offered in 
this paper does offer an overview of how SMEs are categorised and characterised to 
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raise significant concerns about fundamental flaws in the assumptions underlying SME 
policymaking, suggesting a potential cause for its lack of effectiveness.  
Future research is needed to further explore the impact and implications of how SMEs 
are categorised and characterised for SME policy, amid a wider range of political 
discourse as well as in different cultural, political and economic contexts. While we 
focus on SME policy, there are also potential questions for problem definition in terms 
of the characterisation of entrepreneurs and therefore for entrepreneurship policy (see 
e.g. Jones and Spicer, 2005). There is a continuing need to robustly evaluate policy 
interventions but also the underlying assumptions that underpin them. Most importantly, 
there is a need to develop serious and public debate over SME policy through the 
production and promotion of rigorous empirical evidence that is available and promoted 
to stakeholders. 
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